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“[W]e cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid particular words 
without also running a substantive risk of suppressing ideas in the process.”1
Introduction
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation2 is probably best known as the case concerning George 
Carlin’s satiric monologue, “Filthy Words”, otherwise known as the “Seven Dirty 
Words” bit.  Of course, the more lasting effect of the decision is the legal principle that 
indecent speech, while falling within the ambit of First Amendment protection, can be 
regulated by the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC” or “Commission”).  
However, the limited nature of the holding has sometimes been overlooked, especially 
the caveats and qualifications sprinkled throughout both the majority and concurring 
opinions.3  Given that much of the Supreme Court’s belief that its decision would not 
unduly chill broadcasters’ speech depended on the narrowness of the holding, and the 
Commission’s assurance of self-restraint in its enforcement,4 it is critically important to 
examine the decision and subsequent FCC action under this lens.  The limited nature of 
the holding is particularly relevant today, given the Commission’s most recent and public 
push to vigorously pursue broadcasters for airing what it views as indecent material.  
1
 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
2
 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
3 See, e.g., id. at 750.
4 See, e.g., id. at 762 n.4.
2Part I of this article will provide some background of the Pacifica case and will look at 
the various opinions penned by the Supreme Court with a particular focus on the 
narrowness of each opinion.  This section will also examine the FCC’s initial reaction to 
the decision, including its indecency enforcement actions in the following years.  Part II 
will consider the atmosphere during the late 1980s that prompted the FCC’s re-
examination of its indecency enforcement policy, resulting in a set of orders issued by the 
FCC in April 1987.5  Through these orders, the Commission changed course and 
instituted a more sweeping enforcement agenda, giving itself more power in the process.  
Part II will also analyze the string of cases, popularly known as the ACT cases,6 decided 
by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (“D.C. Circuit”), 
which addressed the FCC’s expanded enforcement policy.  Finally, Part III of this article 
will look at the Commission’s enforcement tendencies after the April 1987 orders up to 
the present, including an examination of the FCC’s 2001 Policy Statement, which 
attempted to provide broadcasters with guidance on the indecency issue.  Part III will 
culminate in the recent whirlwind of activity, from the Golden Globe Awards decision 
issued in March 2004, to the recent passage of “broadcast decency” bills in Congress.  
Throughout, this article will consider whether the Commission has shown the restraint 
the Supreme Court relied upon in Pacifica, and in the end, concludes it has not.  By 
failing to do so, the Commission continues to erode the limited nature of the original 
holding and the First Amendment rights of broadcasters in the process.
5
 Infinity Broadcasting Corp. of Pa., 2 FCC Rcd 2705 (1987); Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 2 FCC Rcd 2703 
(1987); Pacifica Found., 2 FCC Rcd 2698 (1987).
6
 Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Action for Children’s Television 
v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 
1995).
3I.  The Stage is Set - The Pacifica Decision
A. Background
A single FCC complaint gave birth to the Pacifica case.7  The complaint was filed against
a Pacifica-owned New York radio station for broadcasting comedian George Carlin’s 12-
minute monologue entitled “Filthy Words”.8  The monologue, recorded before a live 
audience in a California theater, consisted of Carlin’s use of the following seven words
that he believed you couldn’t say on the public airwaves:  shit, piss, fuck, cunt, 
cocksucker, mother-fucker and tits.9  The overall tone of the monologue was satirical, 
poking fun at the words themselves, and questioning why certain words are so offensive.  
Pacifica described the monologue as an attempt by Carlin to explore society’s attitudes 
towards the words.10
The Carlin material aired on October 30, 1973 at about 2:00 p.m.11  According to the 
station, the broadcast was preceded by a warning that the program contained sensitive 
language that might be regarded as offensive to some.12  John R. Douglas, a member of 
Morality in Media filed a complaint with the FCC claiming he heard the broadcast while 
7 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 730.
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 729 and app. at 751.  A verbatim transcript of Carlin’s “Filthy Words” monologue can be found in an 
appendix to the decision.  Id. at 751-55.  
10 Id. at 730.
11 Id. at 729.
12 Id. at 730.
4driving with his young son, who was 15 years old.13  Mr. Douglas lived in Ft. Lauderdale, 
Florida at the time of the broadcast and stated in the complaint that he was traveling in 
New York with his son.14   There is some speculation that Mr. Douglas was not in the 
broadcast audience that day due in part to the fact that he resided in Ft. Lauderdale and 
because the complaint was filed six weeks after the material aired.15
On February 21, 1975, the Commission ruled in favor of Mr. Douglas’ complaint, but did 
not issue a fine against Pacifica.16  The order held the FCC had the power to regulate 
“indecent” broadcasting based on two statutes.17  The first statute, 18 U.S.C.  § 1464, 
prohibits the utterance of “obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio 
communication,”18 and the second, 47 U.S.C. § 303(g), requires the Commission to 
“encourage the larger and more effective use of radio in the public interest.”19
The Commission’s indecency finding rested on the assertion that when certain words 
depict sexual and excretory activities in a patently offensive manner and are repeated 
over and over at a time when children are undoubtedly in the audience, the language is 
13
 Jeff Demas, Seven Dirty Words:  Did They Help Define Indecency? 20 COMM. AND LAW 39, 43 (1998).
14 Id.
15
 Robert Corn-Revere, New Age Comstockery:  Exon Vs. The Internet, Cato Institute (June 28, 1995), 
available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-232.html (citing LUCAS A. POWE JR., AMERICAN
BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 186 (Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1987).
16 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 730.
17 Id. at 731.
18
 18 U.S.C. § 1464.
19
 47 U.S.C. § 303(g).
5indecent.20  While not advocating an outright ban on indecent material, the Commission 
proposed treating indecent broadcasts as a “nuisance” that could be channeled and aired 
only during certain hours.21
While the Commission ruled against Pacifica, not every commissioner was optimistic 
about a court upholding the FCC finding of indecency.  According to telephone 
interviews conducted by Jeff Demas with Joseph Marino, the Commission’s chief legal 
counsel during the Pacifica case, the FCC felt that Congress was forcing them to pursue 
the complaint because Congress had been concerned with sexually explicit radio shows 
for some time.22  The commissioners were aware that the case represented an aspect of 
FCC regulation that had not yet been directly addressed by the courts: FCC regulation of 
indecency as opposed to obscenity.23  The Commission did not expect a favorable ruling 
from the Supreme Court on the matter,24 which may explain why it decided not to issue a 
fine in the first place.
Pacifica could have been content to take the Commission’s wrist slap, but the station was 
historically concerned with free speech issues25 and, therefore, appealed the 
Commission’s order.  On appeal, the D.C. Circuit reversed the FCC’s order, in a 2 to 1 
20 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 732.
21 Id. at 731.
22
 Demas, supra note 13 at 43.
23 Id. at 42.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 44.
6decision.26  The majority judges split on the reasoning behind the reversal.  One found 
that the FCC order was an attempt at rulemaking on the indecency issue, and considered 
the rule to be overbroad.27  The other concluded that 18 U.S.C. § 1464 was a narrow 
statute intended only to cover obscene language or language not protected by the First 
Amendment.28  The dissenting judge held that the only issue at hand was whether the 
Commission could regulate the language as broadcast, and given such narrow focus, the 
Commission had correctly decided that the daytime broadcast was indecent.29
B.  Enter Stage Left - The Supreme Court Decision
After a denial by the D.C. Circuit for a rehearing en banc ,30 the Commission pursued the 
case to the Supreme Court, which granted the Commission’s petition for certiorari.31  The 
Court produced a fractured 5-4 decision in favor of the Commission.  However, even the 
majority opinion remained cautious in its approach to indecency regulation.  This 
decision has become the main legal rationale for allowing the FCC to regulate indecency. 
Accordingly, it is important to note the narrow and limited scope of the opinion.
1. Majority Opinion
26 Id. at 733.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 733-34.
29 Id. at 734.
30
 Demas, supra note 13 at 45.
31 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 734.
7Justice Stevens delivered the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice 
Rehnquist joined in full, and in which Justices Blackmun and Powell joined in part.32
The majority opinion first addressed whether the FCC order was an effort at formal 
rulemaking or merely a decision based on the facts.  According to the majority, the 
question of future FCC actions under different circumstances was not addressed by the 
FCC order, which was carefully confined to the monologue as broadcast.33  Therefore, 
the Court treated the issue not as an attempt at rulemaking by the Commission, but 
instead as a decision limited to the Carlin material as broadcast in the afternoon.34
This brief portion of the Pacifica opinion is significant.  From the very outset, the 
Supreme Court limited the holding to the facts of the case.  In particular, the holding was 
limited to a broadcast aired in the afternoon of a monologue that repeatedly used “vulgar 
words” for “shock value”.35  In fact, Carlin used the “seven dirty words” a total of 108 
times during his 12-minute monologue.  None of the majority justices addressed the 
implications of extending the FCC’s definition of indecency beyond the Carlin 
monologue.  
32
 Justice Stevens wrote the opinion for parts I, II, III and IV-C, with Chief Justice Burger and Justice 
Rehnquist joining in all parts.  Justices Blackmun and Powell joined in parts I, II, III, and IV-C.  Justice 
Powell wrote a concurring opinion, with which Justice Blackmun joined, voicing their disagreement with the 
Justice Stevens rationale in parts IV-A and IV-B of the opinion. 
33 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 734.
34 Id.
35 See id. at 747.
8The majority also considered Pacifica’s argument that the Commission’s definition of 
indecency under 18 U.S.C. § 1464 was flawed.  While the statute does not define 
indecency, Pacifica argued that for material to be considered indecent, the material must 
contain some “prurient interest,”36 a necessary requirement to a finding of obscenity.37
Pacifica based its argument on the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamling v. United 
States,38 which considered the meaning of indecent in a statute forbidding the mailing of 
“‘obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile’”39 material.  The Court in Hamling
held that the statutory words had “many shades of meaning,”40 but when taken as a whole 
the statute was clearly limited to prohibiting only material that could be considered 
obscene.  Pacifica argued that the same reasoning applied to the prohibition against 
obscene, indecent, and profane broadcasts in 18 U.S.C. § 1464.
The majority rejected Pacifica’s argument on essentially two grounds.  First, it noted that 
while prurient interest is a requirement to an obscenity finding, “the normal definition of 
‘indecent’ merely refers to nonconformance with accepted standards of morality.”41
36 See generally Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491 (1985) (defining prurient for purposes of 
obscenity as “that which appeals to a shameful or morbid interest in sex”).  Id. at 505.
37
 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).  In Miller, the Supreme Court set forth the following guidelines for 
the trier of fact before finding material indecent:  (a) whether the average person, applying contemporary 
community standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether 
the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by applicable 
state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific 
value.  Id.  
38
 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
39 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 740 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1462) (alternation in original).
40 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 740.
41 Id.  This definition is from Webster’s dictionary. Id. at 737 n.14.
9Additionally, the Court distinguished the Hamling case from the Pacifica situation, 
reasoning that the history of the statute in Hamling was primarily concerned with the 
prurient, while the Commission had long interpreted § 1464 to cover more than the 
obscene.  Thus, the majority held that “there is no basis for disagreeing with the 
Commission’s conclusion that indecent language was used in this broadcast.”42
Pacifica also argued that the Commission’s order restricted speech protected by the First 
Amendment because the Commission’s definition of indecency was overbroad.43   The 
majority rejected this argument in part IV-A of its opinion, holding that its review in the 
case was limited to the particular broadcast in question, not a general rule regarding 
indecency.  Since the FCC order was “‘issued in a specific factual context,’”44 the Court 
declined to consider whether the “medicine” prescribed by the FCC would result in some 
broadcasters self-censorship of material protected by the First Amendment.45  Within this 
discussion, the majority argued that while the Commission’s definition might lead 
broadcasters to censor themselves, it would affect only a small area of speech which they 
believed lied only at the periphery of First Amendment concern. 46  The majority’s 
consideration of the speech’s value is what led to Justices Powell and Blackmun’s 
concurring opinion, wherein they disagreed with the Court’s attempt to determine First 
Amendment protection by placing a value system on the speech involved.   
42 Id. at 741.
43 Id. at 742.
44 Id. at 742 (quoting Pacifica Found., 59 F.C.C.2d 892, 893 (1976)).
45 Id. at 743.
46 Id. 
10
With respect to Pacifica’s argument that the government could not prohibit the broadcast 
because it was not obscene, the majority, in part IV-B of its opinion, couched the 
question in terms of whether the First Amendment denies the government any power to 
restrict public broadcast of indecent language under any circumstance.47  The majority 
acknowledged that Carlin’s monologue was entitled to First Amendment protection, and 
that the Commission’s objection to the monologue was based in part on its content.48
However, the majority noted that First Amendment protections are not absolute, listing 
the established exceptions to protected speech, ranging from fighting words to 
obscenity.49
Although indecent material generally did not fit within any of the unprotected categories 
enumerated by the Court, the majority argued that “constitutional protection accorded to 
a communication containing such patently offensive sexual and excretory language need 
not be the same in every context.”50  Returning to its concern about the value of the 
speech involved, the Court reasoned, quoting Chaplinsky,51 that certain utterances are not 
an essential part of the exposition of ideas and are of such slight social value that the 
47 Id. at 744.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 745.  The Supreme Court has established several categories of unprotected speech, or speech that is 
deserving of less protection.  See Virginia State Bd. Of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 
U.S. 748 (commercial speech); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (defamation); Miller v. 
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscenity); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (incitement); 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words).  
50 Id. at 747.
51
 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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benefit from them are outweighed by social interest in order.52  In particular, the Court 
noted that there was no reason to believe the Commission had sanctioned the Carlin 
monologue for the content it contained, but instead for the words chosen, which the Court 
reasoned offend for the same reason obscenity offends.53  Implicit in the Court’s 
discussion was the theory that the speech here was of little value and that such factor 
should be considered in its decision.  Again, the concurring justices disagreed with this 
portion of the majority opinion.    
In the last portion of the majority opinion, part IV-C, the Court set out more specifically 
its rationale for allowing the Commission’s action in this case.  The majority maintained 
that broadcasting as a medium had received limited First Amendment protection in the 
past and provided two relevant reasons for such limitations in Pacifica.  First, the 
majority cited the “uniquely pervasive presence”54 broadcasting has in the lives of 
Americans.  Second, it reasoned that broadcasting is “uniquely accessible to 
children….”55
Having pieced together its reasoning for allowing the Commission to regulate speech 
otherwise protected by the First Amendment, the majority concluded by “emphasiz[ing] 
the narrowness of [its] holding.”56  The majority went on to limit its holding stating “[w]e 
52 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 746.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 748.
55 Id. at 749.
56 Id. at 750.
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have not decided that an occasional expletive in either setting would justify any sanction 
or, indeed, that this broadcast would justify a criminal prosecution.  The Commission’s 
decision rested entirely on a nuisance rationale under which context is all-important.”57
2. Concurring Opinion
As noted above, Justices Powell and Blackmun’s concurring opinion took issue with the 
other three majority Justices regarding the relevance of the Carlin material’s value.  The 
majority had reasoned that the Carlin material was of less value and therefore could be 
viewed as less deserving of First Amendment protection.58  The concurring Justices 
argued the result of the case did not turn on whether Carlin’s monologue had value, 
because that is a decision for each person to make.59
However, Justices Powell and Blackmun did agree that the language used would be 
considered by most to be vulgar and offensive.60  Notably though, they specifically 
limited the category of speech addressed by the Court in Pacifica, stating that the 
language “was chosen specifically for this [vulgar and offensive] quality, and was 
repeated over and over as a sort of verbal shock treatment.  The Commission did not err 
in characterizing this narrow category of language used here as ‘patently offensive’ to 
most people regardless of age.”61
57 Id. 
58 See id. at 746-47.
59 Id. at 761.
60 Id. at 757.
61 Id. at 757 (emphasis added).
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Furthermore, Justices Powell and Blackmun relied heavily on the Commission’s 
purported restraint in addressing the overbreadth issue, determining that there would be 
no undue chilling effect on broadcasters’ speech in the future.  Citing the Commission’s 
own brief to the Court, they declared, “since the Commission may be expected to proceed 
cautiously, as it has in the past…I do not foresee an undue ‘chilling’ effect on 
broadcasters’ exercise of their rights.”62
As Justices Powell and Blackmun provided the deciding votes that tipped the Court to 
uphold the Commission’s order, it is extremely important to recognize the limitations 
their concurring opinion placed on the holding.  In fact, there is some argument to be 
made that on the overbreadth issue, the Court produced only a plurality opinion, as the 
concurring Justices did not joint in parts IV-A and IV-B of the opinion, joining only in 
part IV-C which set forth the rationales of pervasiveness of the medium and accessibility 
to children as the basis for the ruling.  In a plurality opinion, "the holding of the Court 
may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments 
on the narrowest grounds."63  Arguably, the concurring opinion’s rationale for upholding 
the Commission’s order in light of the overbreadth argument was narrower than the 
majority’s opinion, relying on the Commission’s restraint and the fact that the language
was used over and over again as a sort of verbal shock treatment.  This particular 
limitation has been eviscerated by the Commission’s recent decision in the Golden Globe
62 Id. at 762.
63 Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320, 354 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)).
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Awards order, discussed later.  In addition, the Commission’s restraint since Pacifica in 
pursuing indecency complaints appears to sway back and forth based on the political and 
social climate of the time, along with the pressure it receives from various advocacy 
groups and Congress.  Based on the limitations expressed in the concurring opinion, such 
actions by the Commission cannot be the restraint Justices Powell and Blackmun had in 
mind.
3.  Dissenting Opinions
While the majority and concurring opinions certainly limited the Pacifica holding, there 
are still important arguments worth noting in the two dissenting opinions.  The first 
dissent, authored by Justice Stewart, and joined by Justices Brennan, White and Marshall, 
claimed that the Court unnecessarily addressed a constitutional issue.  According to 
Justice Stewart, the construction of the word “indecent” in 18 U.S.C. § 1464 to include 
more than obscenity, while a plausible construction, was not a compelled construction.64
Stewart argued that Supreme Court practice is to avoid constitutional confrontation where 
there is serious doubt as to the statute’s constitutionality.65  Since the Court in Hamling
construed the word indecent to have the same meaning as obscene, and the statutory 
context of the Hamling statute was closely related to 18 U.S.C. § 1464, the word indecent 
should properly be read as meaning no more than obscene.66  Because Carlin’s 
monologue was not obscene, the Commission did not have the authority to ban it.
64 Id. at 778.
65 Id. at 777-78 n.2.
66 Id. at 779-80.
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Justices Brennan and Marshall’s dissent confronted the majority’s opinion on the 
constitutional issues raised.  While agreeing with Justice Stewart that the Court should 
not have reached the constitutional issues, Justice Brennan explained that “while I 
would…normally refrain from expressing my views on any constitutional issues 
implicated in this case…I find the Court’s misapplication of fundamental First 
Amendment principles so patent, and its attempt to impose its notions of propriety on the 
whole of the American people so misguided, that I am unable to remain silent.”67
Justice Brennan argued that the Court committed two errors.  First, it misconstrued the 
nature of privacy interests in an individual’s home when the individual has voluntarily 
chosen to keep a radio or television in the home.68  Second, the Court did not consider the 
constitutionally protected interests of those wishing to transmit and receive broadcasts 
which the Court or the Commission may find offensive.69
On the first account, Justice Brennan noted that an individual’s actions in turning on a 
radio and listening to public airwaves do not implicate fundamental privacy issues.  By 
turning on the radio, Justice Brennan reasoned that the listener chose to participate in a 
sort of public discourse carried over the public airwaves.70  According to Justice Brennan, 
“[w]hatever the minimal discomfort suffered by a listener who inadvertently tunes into a 
67 Id. at 762.
68 Id. at 764.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 764-65.
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program he finds offensive during the brief interval before he can simply extend his arm 
and switch stations or flick the ‘off’ button, it is surely worth the candle to preserve the 
broadcaster’s right to send, and the right of those interested to receive, a message entitled 
to full First Amendment protection.”71
Secondly, Justice Brennan noted that in the past the Court had not prohibited the 
distribution or access to children material otherwise protected by the First Amendment 
unless such material had some significant erotic appeal.72  He cited the Court’s decision 
in Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, wherein the Court held that “[s]peech that is neither obscene 
as to youths nor subject to some other legitimate proscription cannot be suppressed solely 
to protect the young from ideas or images that a legislative body thinks is unsuitable for 
them.”73  Justice Brennan claimed that the majority’s decision had the “lamentable” side 
effect of making “completely unavailable to adults material which may not 
constitutionally be kept even from children.”74  Furthermore, he opined that the Court 
completely failed to take into account that some parents might actually wish to have their 
children hear Carlin’s monologue, and that instead of facilitating a parent’s decision-
making rights in child-rearing, the Court had allowed the Commission to make such 
decisions for the parent.75
71 Id. at 766.
72 Id. at 767.
73 Id. at 768 (quoting Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1975)).
74 Id.
75 Id. at 770.
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Justice Brennan was particularly concerned with the two rationales used by the majority 
to support the FCC’s regulation of indecency in the case:  intrusiveness of the medium 
and access of the material to children.76  In particular, he reasoned that without any limits, 
the Commission could use the rationales as justification to regulate any material the 
Commission found offensive.77  He acknowledged that the concurring opinion attempted 
to avoid such an “unpalatable degree of censorship”78 by relying on the Commission’s 
assurances of restraint.  However, even with a holding limited to the facts of the case, 
Justice Brennan stated he would still let the public and marketplace decide what was 
indecent rather than rely on the Commission’s tastes.79
Noting the trust the Court placed on the Commission’s assurances, Justice Brennan 
threads into his dissent a very prescient discussion regarding the FCC’s future restraint.  
In its brief to the Court, the FCC assured the Court that it only desired to reprimand 
broadcasters on facts similar to the Pacifica case:  A 12-minute broadcast that repeated 
over and over words depicting sexual or excretory activities and organs, and did so in a 
patently offensive manner when children were in the audience.80  Based on these 
assurances, Justice Brennan opined that the FCC should be estopped from using either the 
Pacifica decision or FCC orders in the case as a basis for sanctioning broadcasters unless 
the broadcast contained the type of verbal shock treatment claimed in the Carlin 
76 Id.
77 Id. at 771.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 772.
80 See id. at 768 n.7.
18
monologue and, even then, only if the material was broadcast at times other than the late 
evening.81
Whether the limitations of the case are drawn from the majority, concurring or dissenting 
opinions, two elements about the Pacifica case are clear.  First, the decision was limited 
to the specific facts at hand.  The Supreme Court did not address a rule promulgated by 
the Commission in regulating future situations.  It merely concluded that given the 
repeated use of the kind of words in the Carlin monologue, at a time of day when children 
are likely in the audience, the Commission could act under 18 U.S.C. § 1464.  Second, 
because the Court acknowledged that indecent speech is protected under the First 
Amendment, it relied on the Commission’s assurances that it would proceed cautiously in 
its enforcement duties, thus alleviating concern that enforcement of the statute would 
have an undue chilling effect on broadcasters’ speech.  The following discussion 
illustrates that the FCC’s record of “restraint” in indecency enforcement since Pacifica
has been questionable at best. 
C.  The FCC Holds Its Applause-Initial Restraint by the FCC
In the immediate aftermath of the Pacifica case, many broadcasters feared that the 
decision would have a detrimental effect on their programming.  The FCC quickly tried 
to assuage these concerns, noting the limited nature of the holding and its own 
enforcement restraint.  In a message to broadcasters, FCC Chairman Charles D. Ferris 
assured them that the FCC was “far more dedicated to the First Amendment premise that 
81 Id.
19
broadcasters should air controversial programming than [they] are worried about an 
occasional four-letter word.”82  Ferris further tried to calm concerns about the reach of 
the holding by stating that “the particular set of circumstances in the Pacifica case is 
about as likely to occur again as Halley’s Comet.”83
Further limiting the Pacifica holding was the Commission’s own order leading to the 
case, which stated that it would be inequitable for the FCC to hold a licensee responsible 
for indecent language broadcast during live coverage of a news making event.84  In 
addition, an FCC order issued shortly after the Pacifica case demonstrated the 
narrowness with which the Commission initially viewed the holding.  The order was 
issued in response to a Morality in Media petition to deny a noncommercial educational 
station, WGBH-TV, its license renewal claiming that the station had consistently 
broadcast offensive and vulgar material harmful to children.85  The Commission granted 
the station its license renewal, holding it could not deny the license simply because the 
material was “offensive to some or even a substantial number of listeners.”86  According 
to the Commission, it had to take into account the station’s overall programming, and 
Morality in Media had not provided any evidence that the broadcasts were harmful to 
82
 Demas, supra note 13 at 49 (quoting Which Way the Wind Blows at the FCC after WBAI, BROADCASTING, 
July 24, 1978, at 31).
83
 James C. Hsiung, Indecent Broadcast:  An Assessment of Pacifica’s Impact. COMM. AND LAW 41, 42 
(1998) (quoting Which Way the Wind Blows at the FCC after WBAI, BROADCASTING, July 24, 1978, at 31-
32).
84
 Pacifica Found., 59 F.C.C.2d 892, 893 n.1 (1976)
85
 WGBH Educ. Found., 69 F.C.C. 2d 1250, 1250-51 (1978).
86 Id. at 1252.
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children.  The Commission stated that it intended “strictly to observe the narrowness of 
the Pacifica holding”87 reasoning that Pacifica was limited to language that was 
“repeated over and over as a sort of verbal shock treatment.”88
In another instance of early FCC restraint, in 1983 the Commission denied a complaint 
by the American Legal Foundation (“AFL”), which argued that a radio station’s 
programming violated 18 U.S.C. § 1464 by airing indecent material.89  The AFL claimed 
that the station aired words such as “motherfucker” and “shit” repetitively on its 
programs.90  However, the Commission held that the AFL failed to make a case that the 
station violated the indecency statute and noted that the complaint showed only isolated 
use of the alleged language over a three-year license term.  As such, the use of the words, 
although similar to those addressed in the Pacifica case, did not “amount to the 
repetitious ‘verbal shock treatment’”91 found in Carlin’s monologue.  In particular, the 
Commission noted that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Pacifica did not give the 
Commission the “general prerogative”92 to intervene in any case where words similar to 
those in Pacifica were used.  The Commission again noted that the Supreme Court relied 
87 Id. at 1254.
88 Id.
89
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90 Id. at 760.
91 Id.
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on the repetitive nature of the Carlin monologue in affirming the Commission’s ruling in 
that case.93
There is little question that, at least for a brief period of time after the Pacifica decision, 
the Commission adhered to the limited holding the Supreme Court rendered in the case.  
Of course, Justice Brennan was correct to note that the Court had laid its trust entirely 
with the FCC to ensure it did not go beyond the confines of the decision, since the Court 
did not make much of an attempt to fashion a definition for use in the future, only noting 
that the particular broadcast at issue could be sanctioned.  However, the FCC’s initial 
restraint did not last.
II.  The Other Actors Take Their Place - Congress, Advocacy Groups and the D.C. 
Circuit Address Indecency
A. Congress, Advocacy Groups and the FCC
During the 1980s, Congress and the Commission began to see an increase in pressure 
from advocacy groups angered by what they perceived as the FCC’s failure to enforce the 
indecency statute.  These groups were concerned that, so long as the broadcasters did not 
invoke one of Carlin’s seven dirty words, the Commission was allowing broadcasters to 
air offensive and vulgar material.  Based at least in part on this pressure and increased 
Congressional concern, the FCC changed course on its enforcement policy, taking its first 
of several steps in expanding the Pacifica holding and its enforcement power.    
93 Id.
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Some of the initial pressure came from various advocacy groups.  In June of 1986, 
Morality in Media (“MIM”) organized a picket of FCC offices after President Reagan 
reappointed Mark Fowler as chairman of the FCC.94  Mr. Fowler’s nomination was 
resented by various “decency in media” groups because, in their opinion, he hadn’t done 
enough about indecency.95  In addition to the picketing, the groups also undertook a letter 
writing campaign to protest his nomination.96
In an apparent attempt at damage control, Mr. Fowler met with Brad Curl, a member of 
the National Decency Forum in July 1986.97  Based on a letter summarizing their 
meeting, Mr. Curl advised Mr. Fowler that his group would discontinue picketing the 
FCC office.98  Further, Mr. Curl noted his understanding that the FCC General Counsel 
would cooperate with Mr. Curl’s group on indecency investigations in the future.99  Mr. 
Curl also acknowledged the FCC’s belief that it had not received enough complaints in 
the past to act on the indecency issue, and that, in response, Mr. Curl’s group would 
endeavor to submit more and better documented complaints.100
94
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FCC’s General Counsel at this time, Jack Smith, apparently followed through on the 
parties’ understanding from the meeting.  Around the time of the meeting, MIM began 
forwarding pointers received from Mr. Smith advising MIM members to make tapes or 
transcripts of the broadcasts they found offensive in order to facilitate action on the 
complaints.101  Mr. Smith also directed such advocacy groups away from broadcasts that 
were unlikely to result in a finding of indecency.  In one letter to Donald Wildmon, 
Executive Director of the National Federation of Decency, Mr. Smith warned against 
pursuing a complaint for the broadcast of the film The Rose on a Memphis television 
station. In this letter, Mr. Smith advised “‘as we discussed on the phone today I do not 
believe this presents the kind of air-tight case that you want to push at this time.  We are 
inquiring into a couple of other cases which we think may be more clear violations.  I 
think you should agree with our reasoning on this matter.’”102
Given this backdrop, it is not surprising that complaints filed by Mr. Wildmon against an 
Infinity-owned radio station in September and November of 1986103 led to one of the 
“air-tight” test cases that Mr. Smith referenced in his letter.  The Infinity case, along with 
two others,104 would prove to be the opportunity the FCC was looking for to expand its 
enforcement policy beyond the confines of the Pacifica facts and to greatly expand its 
discretion in determining the meaning of indecency.  There is little question that this push 
101 Id.
102 Id. at 346 (quoting Letter from John B. Smith, General Counsel, FCC, to Donald E. Wildmon, Executive 
Director, National Federation of Decency (September 19, 1986) (retrieved through a Freedom of Information 
Act request made by Pacifica Foundation on May 22, 1987).  Id. at 344.
103 See Infinity Broadcasting Corp. of Pa., 2 FCC Rcd 2705, n.1 (1987).
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to broaden the indecency net would not have taken place without these advocacy groups’ 
tenacious pursuit of the FCC.
B.  FCC April 1987 Orders
The FCC issued three separate orders in April 1987 against a university-run station in 
California,105 an Infinity-owned station in Philadelphia,106 and a Pacifica-owned station in 
Los Angeles,107 holding that the stations had broadcast indecent material.  The 
Commission issued no fines as a result of the orders, acknowledging that the orders 
expanded its previously limited enforcement of the indecency statute.  Specifically, in the 
orders the Commission determined that it would no longer limit what it considered 
indecent to a broadcaster’s repeated use of one of Carlin’s seven dirty words.    
The FCC laid out most of the reasoning for its policy change in its 1987 Pacifica order.  
In response to the complaint, Pacifica argued to the Commission that the material in 
question did not allow for a finding of indecency under 18 USC § 1464, because the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Pacifica limited the finding of indecency to “deliberate, 
105 Univ. of California, 2 FCC Rcd 2703 (1987).  The order focused on the airing of a song entitled “Makin’ 
Bacon” after 10:00 p.m.  As likely discerned from the title, the song concerned sex.  The lyrics are set out in 
the Commission’s order.
106 Infinity, 2 FCC Rcd 2705 (1987).  The order here examined several excerpts from the Howard Stern show 
addressing various topics in a tongue in cheek manner from testicle size to lesbian sex.  The Stern material 
aired in the morning.  The excerpts are set out in full in the Commission’s order.
107 Pacifica, 2 FCC Rcd 2698 (1987).  The Pacifica complaint involved two separate broadcasts.  The first 
contained excerpts from a play on a program targeted to the gay community.  The play portrayed a man dying 
from AIDS.  The material aired after 10:00 p.m.  Portions of the excerpted material can be found in the 
Commission’s order.   The second broadcast concerned a live program in which one of the participants used 
an expletive.  
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repetitive use of the seven words actually contained in the George Carlin monologue.”108
In response, the Commission stated that “[w]hile Commission action subsequent to the 
Pacifica decision may have indicated this to be the Commission’s position, we take this 
opportunity to state that, notwithstanding any prior contrary indications, we will not 
apply the Pacifica standard so narrowly in the future.”109
According to the Commission, the definition of indecent material set out in the Pacifica 
case included more than just the words used in the Carlin monologue.  The FCC argued 
that the words used in the Carlin monologue were “more correctly treated as examples of, 
rather than a definite list of, the kinds of words that, when used in a patently offensive 
manner as measured by contemporary community standards applicable to the broadcast 
medium, constitute indecency.”110  The Commission acknowledged that the Pacifica 
holding still required complaints focusing solely on the use of the expletives to show 
“deliberate and repetitive” use of such language in a patently offensive manner.111
However, the FCC stated that if the complaint went beyond the use of expletives, 
repetition was not a necessary element to the determination of indecency.112  In fact, it 
ruled that context must be considered if the speech involves description or depiction of 
108 Pacifica, 2 FCC Rcd 2689, at 2703. 
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 2704.
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sexual or excretory functions to determine whether the material is patently offensive 
under contemporary community standards.113
The Commission also reversed course on its prior position that indecent material could be 
broadcast if aired after 10:00 p.m. and preceded by a warning.114  In making the change, 
the Commission determined that current evidence on the presence of children in the 
listening audience after 10:00 p.m. warranted a reexamination of this past position.  
Based on an audience survey of the Los Angeles metropolitan area which found that 
approximately 112,000 12-17 year olds were still in the general listening audience 
between 7:00 p.m. and midnight on Sundays, the Commission determined that “relying 
on a specific time for broadcasting indecent material no longer satisfies the requirement 
that indecent material be channeled to a time when there is not a reasonable risk that 
children may be present in the broadcast audience.”115  The FCC made this finding even 
in light of the Arbitron ratings provided by Pacifica which confirmed that Pacifica’s 
KPFK’s listening audience rarely consisted of children.116
In holding that all three stations had broadcast indecent material as determined under the 
Commission’s “new” standards, the Commission did not impose any forfeiture sanctions.  
Because the orders constituted a change to its prior enforcement habits, the Commission 
limited its action to warning the stations and all other broadcasters that the material 
113 Id.
114 Id. at 2705.
115 Id. at 2706.
116 Id.
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would be actionable under the indecency standards as clarified in the orders.  Nowhere in 
the decision did the Commission explain why the standards previously used were 
insufficient.
Along with the April 1987 decisions, the Commission released a general Public Notice 
setting forth the new standards for regulating broadcast indecency.117  In response to the 
Public Notice, several groups petitioned the Commission for a clarification or 
reconsideration of the orders.  The petitioners specifically requested the Commission to:  
(1) provide a precise guideline to determine what material would be considered patently 
offensive; (2) consider the artistic merit of a broadcast in judging whether it is indecent; 
(3) exempt news and informational programming from any indecency ruling; and (4) 
adopt a fixed time of day, after which indecent material could be broadcast without fear 
of sanction.118
The Commission declined to do much of what the petitioners requested.  With regard to 
what constituted patent offensiveness, the Commission noted that context is of the utmost 
importance, but declined to provide a comprehensive index or thesaurus of indecent 
words or pictoral depictions it would consider patently offensive.119  According to the 
Commission, several variables would be considered in the determination of indecent 
material, including (1) whether the use was vulgar or shocking, (2) whether the use was 
117
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118
 Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 3 FCC Rcd 930, 931 (1978).
119 Id. at 931-32.
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isolated or fleeting, (3) the ability of the medium to separate adults from children, (4) 
whether children were in the audience, and (5) the merit of the work.120  However, none 
of the factors would be dispositive, nor would a finding that the material had merit render 
the material not indecent per se.121  The Commission was now affording itself wide 
discretion to determine what would be considered indecent.  Even though it 
acknowledged its previous enforcement standard was clearly easier, both for the 
Commission and broadcasters, the Commission argued that it could lead to unjustifiable 
anomalous results.122 The Commission did not, however, provide any examples of these 
so-called anomalous results.  
Although the Commission did not clarify much for the petitioners, it did set forth a new 
guideline for the time of day after which indecent material could be broadcast.    The 
Commission now believed a reasonable risk existed that children may be in the audience 
at 10:00 p.m.123  Therefore, the Commission noted its “current thinking” was that 
midnight was late enough “to ensure that the risk of children in the audience is minimized 
and to rely on parents to exercise increased supervision…”124
Looking back at the Supreme Court’s decision in Pacifica, it is apparent that Justices 
Powell and Blackmun relied too heavily on the Commission’s future restraint.  The 
120 Id. at 932.
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 930.
123 Id. at 937 n.47.
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concurrence specifically stated “since the Commission may be expected to proceed 
cautiously, as it has in the past…I do not foresee an undue ‘chilling’ effect on 
broadcasters’ exercise of their rights.”125  Justices Brennan and Marshall were better 
prognosticators when they noted in their dissent, “I am far less certain than my Brother 
Powell that…faith in the Commission…is warranted…and even if I shared it, I could not 
so easily shirk the responsibility assumed by each Member of this Court jealously to 
guard against encroachments on First Amendment freedoms.”126
C.  The D.C. Circuit Steps into the ACT
Several groups challenged the Commission’s new enforcement policy in Action for 
Children’s Television v. F.C.C.127 (“ACT I”) filed in the D.C. Circuit.  The petitioners 
claimed that the Commission’s generic definition of indecency was unconstitutionally 
vague and overbroad, and that the Commission’s decision to change the time after which 
indecent material could be broadcast from 10:00 p.m. to midnight was arbitrary and 
capricious.128
Initially, the D.C. Circuit rejected the Commission’s position that it should consider the 
indecency definition only with respect to the specific facts in the April 1987 orders, i.e., 
whether the material in those cases were indecent as broadcast.  The court quickly noted 
that the facts at hand presented a much different situation than that confronting the 
125 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 762 n.4.
126 Id. at 769.
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Supreme Court in Pacifica.  According to the court, the Commission had clearly engaged 
in a form of rulemaking through its April 1987 orders, its Public Notice, and the 
Reconsideration Memorandum and Opinion.129  Contrary to the Commission’s position in 
Pacifica, the Commission this time intended to apply the new enforcement standards to 
all broadcasts on a prospective basis.  
Addressing the petitioners’ claim of vagueness, the court concluded it did not have the 
authority to address the question on its merits.  According to the D.C. Circuit, since the 
Supreme Court in its Pacifica opinion quoted the FCC’s generic definition with “seeming 
approval” then implicit within the Supreme Court’s decision was the determination that 
the definition was not inherently vague.130  Interestingly, the D.C. Circuit explicitly stated 
in its opinion that if in reaching that conclusion it had “misunderstood Higher Authority,” 
it welcomed correction from such Higher Authority (i.e., the Supreme Court).131  The 
D.C. Circuit’s holding on this issue is curious, given that the Supreme Court in Pacifica
had specifically limited its holding and the reach of the decision to the specific facts of 
the case.  The Supreme Court explicitly declined to address whether the definition used 
by the Commission in Pacifica would be upheld in future situations.  In fact, the Supreme 
Court never addressed whether the indecency definition used by the FCC was vague, but 
instead considered whether to interpret the word indecent in the statute to require a 
finding of obscenity.132
129 Id. at 1337.
130 Id. at 1339.
131 Id.
132 See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 735 and 739-40.
31
The D.C. Circuit considered the overbreadth challenge on its merits.  One argument 
presented by the petitioners was that the FCC could not deem material indecent unless the 
work taken as a whole lacked serious merit.  Because social value entitles otherwise 
obscene material protection under the Miller standard, 133 the petitioners argued at the 
very least, the same should hold true for arguable indecent material.134  The FCC 
countered that it did take into consideration merit in determining whether material is 
indecent; however it would not consider it a dispositive factor.135
In the end, the court agreed with the FCC, noting that although the new enforcement 
standards would invade protected freedoms of adults, the power of the state to control the 
conduct of children reached beyond the scope of its authority over adults.136  As support, 
the court cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Ginsberg v. New York,137 which upheld a 
state statute prohibiting the distribution of non-obscene, but sexually explicit materials to 
children.  Of course, one key difference between Ginsberg and the broadcast indecency 
arena is that limiting the sale of such materials in Ginsberg did not affect the ability of 
adults to obtain the materials.  That is certainly not the case if broadcasters are forced to 
alter programming to avoid indecency sanctions.
133 See supra note 37.
134 Action for Children’s Television, 852 F.2d at 1339.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 1340.
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Unfortunately, the D.C. Circuit made the same mistake as the concurring Justices did in 
Pacifica.   In a footnote on the overbreadth issue, the D.C. Circuit noted that although it 
would not completely defer to the FCC’s judgment on what is indecent, the FCC had 
assured the court it would continue to give weight to reasonable licensee judgments when 
deciding to impose sanctions in a particular case.138  Because of this “assurance” the 
court concluded that the chilling effect of the indecency definition would be “tempered 
by the Commission’s restrained enforcement policy.”139  Given that no indecency fines 
were imposed on broadcasters from 1978 to 1987, the court most likely felt safe in 
relying on the Commission’s purported restraint.  This is an extraordinary amount of trust 
to place in five commissioners selected by the President, confirmed by the Senate and 
funded by Congress. 
The last issue confronted by the D.C. Circuit was the newly-issued safe harbor hours, 
altering the times when broadcasters could air indecent material.  Reasoning that the 
Commission is an agency, the court held that the FCC must articulate a rational 
connection between the facts found and the choices made.140  According to the court, the 
Commission failed to do this.  Reasoning that broadcasters were now faced with a less 
than precise definition of indecency, the court concluded that a failure to provide a 
clearly defined safe harbor would surely lead broadcasters to avoid such programming 
altogether.141  Based on its safe harbor analysis, the court vacated in part the FCC’s 
138 Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332, 1340 n.14.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 1341.
141 Id. at 1342.
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reconsideration order and returned the Pacifica and Regents of the University of 
California decisions to the Commission for redetermination, since the broadcasts at issue 
in those cases were aired after 10:00 p.m.
It is noteworthy that the court upheld the generic definition of indecency without 
requiring the Commission to demonstrate a need for the new enforcement standards.  In 
remanding the safe harbor hours issue, the D.C. Circuit required the Commission to 
articulate a rational connection between the facts found and the choices made.  However, 
the D.C. Circuit did not require the Commission to do the same for this very important 
change in its enforcement policy.  The Commission never provided any evidence of the 
anomalous results it cited as the reason for the policy change.  
Two months after the ACT I decision, Congress stepped into the fray by passing the 
Helms amendment, signed by President Bush on October 1, 1988, which required the 
FCC to enforce the indecency prohibition in 18 U.S.C. § 1464 on a 24-hour basis, starting 
January 31, 1989.142   Before introducing the bill, Senator Jesse Helms sought advice 
from the Heritage Foundation and the former General Counsel of the FCC on the 
constitutionality of such a 24-hour prohibition.143  Helms was advised that although the
bill itself was constitutionally uncertain, strong congressional custom was to enact such 
an uncertain law if it promoted sound public policy.144
142
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The question of the amendment’s constitutionally was decided by the D.C. Circuit in 
Action for Children’s Television v. F.C.C.145 (ACT II).  The court, relying on its initial 
ACT I decision, concluded that the Commission must afford some reasonable period of 
time for the broadcasting of indecent material.146  As such, neither the Commission nor 
Congress could completely ban the broadcasting of indecent material, since it is protected 
First Amendment speech.  Acknowledging that while Congress’ “apparent belief that a 
total ban on broadcast indecency is constitutional, it is ultimately the judiciary’s task, 
particularly in the First Amendment context, to decide whether Congress has violated the 
Constitution.”147  With the 24-hour ban, the court held Congress had violated 
broadcasters’ First Amendment rights.  
The current status of the safe harbor hours was finally determined in the 1995 case of 
Action for Children’s Television v. F.C.C.148 (ACT III).  In this case, the D.C. Circuit 
considered whether Section 16(a) of the Public Telecommunications Act of 1992 was 
constitutional.  The provision provided that indecent materials could only be broadcast 
between the hours of midnight and 6:00 a.m.149  However, the Act made an exception for 
145
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public radio and television stations that go off the air at or before midnight, allowing such 
stations to broadcast indecent materials after 10:00 p.m., instead of midnight.150
The petitioners in ACT III argued the provision violated their First Amendment rights 
because it imposed restrictions on indecent broadcasts without being narrowly tailored to 
the purported compelling government interest.151  The court rejected this argument; 
although the court agreed that such a strict scrutiny analysis was the appropriate standard 
to use in determining whether the Commission and Congress had appropriately regulated 
indecent speech, because it is protected by the First Amendment.152  However, the court 
noted that based on Pacifica, the analysis under the strict scrutiny test was more 
deferential than for other forms of media.153  According to the court, two of the 
government’s proffered reasons for regulating indecent speech were compelling:  
assisting parent’s supervision of their children’s exposure to broadcasting and protecting 
children’s psychological health.154
The court then turned to whether the regulation employed the least restrictive means 
necessary to accomplish the compelling government interest.  Reasoning that fewer 
children watch television and listen to the radio between midnight and 6:00 a.m. than 
during the day, and that many adults tune in at such hours, the regulation was, in the 
150 Id.
151 Id. at 659.
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court’s opinion, narrowly tailored.155  However, because Section 16(a) provided an 
exemption from the midnight to 6:00 a.m. safe harbor for public stations that go off the 
air at or before midnight, the court concluded that the section affected disparate treatment 
amongst broadcasters.  According to the court, Congress did not explain how this 
disparate treatment advanced its goal of protecting children, and therefore, the court set 
aside the more restrictive midnight to 6:00 a.m. safe harbor and remanded the case to the 
Commission with instructions to limit its ban to the hours of 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m.156
The series of ACT decisions were a blow to many First Amendment proponents.  While 
the Supreme Court had limited its holding in Pacifica to the facts of the case, the D.C. 
Circuit in ACT I considered the definition of indecency as it might be applied in future 
situations.  Unfortunately, the court refused to consider the petitioners’ argument that the 
indecency definition was unconstitutionally vague, based on its belief the Supreme Court 
in Pacifica had cited the FCC definition with seeming approval.  Just as disheartening 
was the D.C. Circuit’s reliance on the FCC’s purported restraint in enforcing its 
newfound power as the linchpin of its decision that the indecency definition was not 
unconstitutionally overbroad.  
Notwithstanding these disappointments, it is still important to note that the ACT decisions 
did not give the Commission cart blanche.  For one thing, the D.C. Circuit acknowledged 
that any restriction on indecent speech is content based and therefore subject to a strict 
155 Id. at 665.
156 Id. at 668.
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scrutiny analysis by the courts.  Although the court noted more deference would be given 
to such restrictions in the broadcast medium than in other mediums, it still required that 
any restrictions on indecent speech be narrowly tailored to support a compelling 
government interest.  
Furthermore, the court again relied on the Commission’s purported enforcement restraint 
in ruling that the definition used was not unconstitutionally overbroad.  In doing so, the 
court necessarily relied on the FCC’s statement that it would still require repetitive use of 
expletives for a finding of indecency.157  Given the FCC’s fairly restrained history of 
enforcement at the time of the ACT I decision,158 the court’s reliance on the FCC’s 
assurance may have seemed reasonable.  Once again, however, the Commission took the 
inch and turned it into a mile.
III. The FCC and Congress Take Center Stage
A.  FCC Enforcement and the 2001 Policy Statement
While the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit relied on the Commission’s promised 
enforcement restraint in Pacifica and the ACT cases, broadcasters could not do the same.  
Based on the number of indecency fines issued since Pacifica until 1997, it appears that 
the vigor with which indecency actions were pursued fluctuated, forcing broadcasters to 
guess from year to year when the next crack down on enforcement would come and 
pondering what the commissioners that year would consider indecent.   
157 Pacifica Found., 2 FCC Rcd, at 2703.
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As previously noted, from Pacifica until the FCC’s April 1987 orders, indecency 
sanctions by the Commission were nonexistent.159  In fact, no indecency fines were 
issued by the Commission between 1978 and 1987.160  From 1987 until 1997 the 
Commission issued thirty-six indecency fines.161 Thirty-one of those thirty-six fines were 
issued between 1989 and 1994, during the bulk of Commissioner Chair Alfred Sikes’ 
tenure.162  Chairman Sikes’ helm at the Commission, however, may have been affected 
by Congressional concern over indecency.
Between 1985 and 1987 not a single FCC nominee was asked about his or her stance on 
indecency.163  However, during three nomination hearings in 1989, including Chairman 
Sikes’ hearing, the nominees were asked what they proposed to do about the indecency 
problem.164  Perhaps this interest from Congress explains the increased number of fines 
issued between 1989 and 1994.  Congress perceived indecency to be a problem, 
therefore, the Commission perceived indecency to be a problem.  Chairman Sikes himself 
made it clear that enforcement of the indecency statute would be a prominent feature of 
159
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his term.165  The Commission’s indecency enforcement, however, slowed after 1994, due 
in part to the fact that the new FCC Chair, Reed Hundt, came to the Commission with a 
focus on children’s programming as opposed to indecency policing.166
In addition to facing the FCC’s changing enforcement habits over the years, broadcasters 
also had to make programming decisions in light of the amorphous indecency definition 
approved by the D.C. Circuit in ACT I.  In 1994, however, it appeared that broadcasters 
might get some assistance in understanding the Commission’s application of the 
definition when, pursuant to a settlement with Evergreen Media Corporation, the 
Commission agreed to issue guidelines regarding the Commission’s indecency orders.167
The guidelines were supposed to be released within 90 days of the February 22, 1994 
settlement;168 however, broadcasters would not see the actual policy statement until April 
6, 2001.  Even seven years later, it still provided little actual guidance.
According to the FCC’s 2001 Policy Statement169 (“Guidelines”), an indecency finding 
requires two determinations.  First, the material must describe or depict sexual or 
excretory organs or activities.170  Second, the broadcast must be patently offensive as 
165 Id. at 143.
166 Id. at 149-50.
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measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium.171  The 
Guidelines provide that community standards are measured by the average broadcast 
viewer or listener, without regard for a particular region or area of the country.172
In making an indecency finding, the Guidelines note that context is “critically 
important.”173  Even if explicit language is used, that is not the end of the analysis, nor is 
the fact that the broadcast refrains from using explicit language.  Illustrating the 
importance of context the Guidelines state that “[e]xplicit language in the context of a 
bona fide newscast might not be patently offensive, while sexual innuendo that persists 
and is sufficiently clear to make the sexual meaning inescapable might be.”174
Also set forth is the following list of “principal factors” the Commission relies upon in 
making a determination of indecency: “1) the explicitness or graphic nature of the 
description or depiction of sexual or excretory organs or activities; (2) whether the 
material dwells on or repeats at length descriptions or sexual or excretory organs or 
activities; (3) whether the material appears to pander or is used to titillate, or whether 
the material appears to have been presented for its shock value.”175   Here again, the 
171 Id. at ¶ 8.
172 Id.
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overall context is crucial and no single factor “generally provides the basis for an 
indecency finding.”176
The Guidelines provide 31 case examples meant to help broadcasters determine what 
kind of material the Commission would consider indecent.  Unfortunately, the 
Commission took great pains to note that the examples were only “intended as a research 
tool and should not be taken as a meaningful selection of words and phrases to be 
evaluated for indecency purposes without the fuller context that the tapes or transcripts 
provide.”177  So, from the outset, the examples provide little guidance to broadcasters 
trying to steer clear of the Commission’s wide net.  
Of the examples, only four were television broadcasts, and all four were found not to 
have aired indecent material.  Of the 28 radio broadcast examples, all but 5 were found to 
have aired indecent material.  For broadcasters hoping to find clarification on what the 
Commission would deem indecent, the examples were not particularly instructive.  For 
instance, in one example, the Commission found a broadcast of the Howard Stern show 
indecent for snippets from Stern such as “God, my testicles are like down to the 
floor…you could really have a party with these…Use them like Bocci balls.”178
However, a radio station broadcast in South Carolina of “[t]he hell I did, I drove the 
mother-fucker, oh.” was found not indecent.179
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Because the Commission cautioned against any broadcaster’s definitive reliance on the 
examples, their usefulness was severely limited.  In addition, although the Guidelines 
outlined three factors the Commission would consider in determining whether material 
was indecent, the failure of the material to meet one or even all of the factors would still 
not preclude an indecency finding.  Examining each factor, it is clear the Commission 
must inevitably engage in a highly subjective analysis, and in doing so substitutes the 
commissioners’ opinions and tastes for that of “contemporary community standards for 
the broadcast medium.”  Whether five commissioners can be relied upon to effectively 
gauge what constitutes contemporary community standards is a crucial question in 
examining FCC enforcement policy.  A recent survey seems to indicate the 
commissioners have a serious disconnect with much of the broadcasting community they 
claim to represent.
In March of 2004, Edison Media Research and Jacobs Media polled almost 14,000 
listeners of over 40 alternative rock, classic rock, and alternative music radio stations to 
gauge their views of indecency over the airwaves.180  The survey posed a series of 
questions, one of which asked whether their morning radio programs offended 
respondents.181  Only 2% of the respondents said they were offended frequently, 9.2% 
said sometimes, 34.2% said rarely and over half, 54.6% said they were never offended by 
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their radio programs.182  Eighty percent of the listeners responded that people who want 
to listen to Howard Stern on the radio should be able to do so, and nearly 81% agreed that 
even if a small group of listeners is offended by a radio show’s content, the FCC should 
not take action against it.183  From the results of the survey, it appears the Commission 
and listeners of “rock” music stations have a very different view of what might be 
considered patently offensive.  Given that the question of whether material is patently 
offensive is one of the linchpins to a finding of indecency, this disconnect is crucial in 
indecency sanctions.  
From the Commission’s fluctuating vigor in pursuing complaints and designating 
material as indecent to its failure to provide real guidance in its 2001 Policy Statement, 
broadcasters were left guessing after the FCC’s April 1987 orders.  Unfortunately, just 
when it seemed the regulatory picture could not get any worse for broadcasters, Bono 
dropped the F-bomb, Janet flashed some flesh, and the indecency net was cast wider once 
again.
B.  The Golden Globe Awards Decision and Recent Congressional and FCC 
Action
Given the subjective nature of the Commission’s indecency analysis, it is not surprising 
that the Commission cannot even remain consistent with its previously announced 
policies or decisions.  A good example of this inconsistency is the Commission’s March 
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18, 2004 decision regarding U-2’s lead singer, Bono, and his acceptance speech at the 
2003 Golden Globe Awards show.  
During a Golden Globe Awards program on January 19, 2003, Bono, in accepting an 
award for “Best Original Song”, said “[t]his is really, really, fucking brilliant.  Really, 
really great.”184  The FCC received 234 complaints regarding the broadcast, 217 of which 
were filed by individuals associated with Parents Television Council.185
In October 2003, the FCC’s Enforcement Bureau (the first stop on a complaint’s process 
through the FCC) issued a decision denying the complaint.186  The decision reasoned that 
the Commission’s role in overseeing program content was limited and that any action 
taken against indecent programming must take into account that indecent speech is 
protected under the First Amendment.187  With respect to the specific material broadcast, 
the Bureau noted that even as a “threshold matter” the material aired did not describe or 
depict sexual or excretory activities or functions because the word was used as an 
adjective or expletive for emphasis.188  Citing its own 2001 Policy Statement, the Bureau 
explained that in similar circumstances it had found offensive language used as an insult 
as opposed to a description of sexual or excretory functions or activities was not within 
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its scope of prohibiting indecent material.189  In addition, the Bureau pointed out that the 
use was isolated and fleeting, and again based on past decisions was not actionable.190
As with the Congressional activity in the late 80s, Congress, unhappy with the Bureau’s 
decision, acted by jumping into the fray.  Both houses of Congress passed resolutions 
shortly after the Bureau’s decision pushing for the Commission’s full review and 
reversal.191  This Congressional push, coupled with the fallout from the Janet 
Jackson/Justin Timberlake Super Bowl half-time show, during which Ms. Jackson’s 
breast was briefly exposed, prompted the full Commission to act on March 18, 2004, 
reversing its own Enforcement Bureau.  In doing so, the Commission contradicted both 
its 2001 Policy Statement and previous Commission decisions.    
The Commission’s order acknowledged that the use of the word by Bono was as an 
exemplifier.192  Nonetheless, the Commission concluded that the core meaning of the “F-
Word” had a sexual connotation, and therefore, described sexual activities and met the 
first prong requirement of an indecency finding.193  The Commission next considered 
whether the broadcast was patently offensive.  Claiming that the “F-Word” is “one of the 
most vulgar, graphic and explicit descriptions of sexual activity in the English language,” 
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the Commission quickly determined the use was patently offensive.  According to the 
opinion, the use was “shocking and gratuitous,” and the fact that the use was 
unintentional was irrelevant.194
Confronting its obviously contrary precedent on the isolated and fleeting nature of the 
use, the Commission stated that “while prior Commission and staff action have indicated 
that isolated or fleeting broadcasts of the ‘F-Word’ such as that here are not indecent or 
would not be acted upon, consistent with our decision today, we conclude that any such 
interpretation is no longer good law.”195  In particular, the Commission had to repudiate 
its own words in its April 1987 Pacifica order that prompted the ACT I case.  In that 
order, the Commission stated that if a complaint focused “solely on the use of expletives, 
we believe that . . . deliberate and repetitive use in a patently offensive manner is a 
requisite to a finding of indecency.”196  The Commission held that it now departed from 
that portion of its 1987 Pacifica decision, and any other cases where the Commission had 
held that the isolated or fleeting use of the “F-Word” in situations similar to the Bono 
case would not be considered indecent.197
Not content with holding the broadcast indecent, the Commission also determined that 
Bono’s use of the “F-Word” was “profane” under 18 U.S.C. § 1464, a contention not 
even made by the Parents Television Council, the group which launched the appeal to the 
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full Commission.198  The Commission found that although its previous precedent only 
focused on profanity under the statute in the context of blasphemy, “[b]roadcasters are on 
notice that the Commission in the future will not limit its definition of profane speech to 
only those words and phrases that contain an element of blasphemy or divine 
imprecation, but, depending on the context, will also consider under the definition of 
‘profanity’ the ‘F-Word’ and those words (or variants thereof) that are as highly offensive 
as the ‘F-Word’….”199
The Commission’s departure from precedent and distancing from its 2001 Policy 
Statement exemplifies the problem inherent upon any court’s reliance on Commission 
restraint in protecting broadcasters’ First Amendment rights.  As detailed throughout this 
article, the Commission proclaims to the courts that it will be circumspect in its 
enforcement of the indecency statute, thus allowing the courts the ability to claim that 
enforcement will not unduly chill protected First Amendment speech.  However, each 
time the courts have relied upon such FCC guarantees, the FCC, prompted by a host of 
political and social factors, has switched strategies and expanded its enforcement power.  
Each time, the Commission has done so relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Pacifica.  
In fact, the Commission’s decision in the Bono case claimed that its decision was not 
inconsistent with Pacifica, because the Supreme Court had explicitly left the door open as 
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to whether the occasional utterance of an expletive would be considered indecent.200  In 
making this claim, the Commission cites the majority opinion, but specifically sets forth a 
portion of the concurring opinion.201  But the portion of the concurring opinion to which 
the Commission cites was specifically attempting to note the limited manner of the 
Court’s holding and the restraint with which the Commission had assured the Court it 
would act in the future.202  There is quite a bit of irony in the fact that the Commission 
now uses the passage intended to limit the Court’s holding and thus the Commission’s 
authority, in an effort to expand its reach.
The Commission’s Golden Globe decision came amidst a call for increased regulation of 
indecency from Congress after the infamous Super Bowl halftime show featuring Janet 
Jackson and Justin Timberlake.  In the wake of this event, each chamber of Congress 
passed its own version of a bill purporting to crack down on indecent speech.  A House 
Bill passed on March 11, 2004 would increase the amount a broadcaster can be fined for 
each indecency violation from $27,500 to $500,000.203  In addition, the bill provides that 
the Commission can begin licensee revocation proceedings against a broadcaster with 
three or more indecency violation findings on its record during any term of its license.204
On June 22, 2004, the Senate passed portions of a bill originally introduced in January as 
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part of a defense bill.205  The provisions included in the bill would increase fines for 
broadcasters from $27,500 to $275,000 per incident, and for personalities from $11,000 
to $275,000 per incident; the fines would increase for each incident until reaching the 
maximum of $3,000,000 a day.206  In addition, the provisions added would delay for one 
year the FCC’s media ownership rules passed in 2003.207
While this recent flurry of activity indicates an ever-increasing willingness by the 
Commission and Congress to expand the Commission’s enforcement authority, it appears 
that the increased vigor towards indecency enforcement actually began back in 2001, at 
the outset of Commission Chairman Michael Powell’s tenure.  Since Chairman Powell 
took office in mid-January 2001, the FCC has issued 18 proposed indecency forfeitures 
for a total of $1.4 million in proposed fines.208  That amount exceeds the total amount of 
about $850,000 in indecency forfeitures proposed during the prior seven years under two 
previous Commissions.209  In fact, as of April 19, 2004, the FCC had proposed more fines 
for broadcast indecency in 2004 alone than the previous 10 years combined.210
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Under Chairman Powell, the Commission has increased the base amount of the typical 
fine for indecency violations from $7,000 to the statutory maximum of $27,500 per 
incident.211  Further, the Commission has notified broadcasters that it may begin license 
revocation proceedings for “serious” indecency violations,212 but has not notified 
broadcasters what it will consider “serious” violations.  The Commission has also 
informed broadcasters that it may treat multiple utterances within a single program as 
constituting multiple indecency violations, rather than following its traditional per 
program approach.213  The Commission’s indecency investigations have also been 
expanded to cover not only the broadcast station that is the subject of a particular 
complaint, but also to cover co-owned stations, regardless of whether any complaint was 
even received about a co-owned station.214
By all accounts, the Commission’s lack of restraint in enforcing the indecency statute has 
had a real and substantial effect on broadcasters’ programming.  A week after the Super 
Bowl show, NBC decided to pull a scene from an ER episode showing an 80-year old 
woman’s breast while she received medical care.215 ABC decided to darken a sex scene 
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on an episode of NYPD Blue, a show that has been airing such fare for a decade.216
Beyond television, radio programmers are now pulling or editing long-aired songs such 
as Pink Floyd’s “Money”, Steve Miller Band’s “Jet Airliner”, The Who’s “Who Are 
You?”, and Pearl Jam’s “Jeremy,” due to infrequent and in some instances isolated use of 
expletives.217  Clear Channel fired disk jocky Todd Clem, the host of Bubba the Love 
Sponge and permanently pulled Howard Stern from six markets.218  The recent indecency 
crackdown led one radio insider to claim “[i]t’s as if someone turned the thermostat down 
20 degrees.  It’s had a very chilling effect.”219
Even PBS has not been untouched by the “chilling effect”.  The producers of a PBS 
documentary on Emma Goldman agreed to cut a couple of seconds out of a love scene for 
fear of showing too much cleavage.220 Ironically, Emma Goldman was a 20th century 
anarchist and advocate of free speech.  An independently produced film to be aired on 
PBS about activist/author Piri Thomas also recently came under fire.  The film included 
the author reading excerpts from his novel “Down These Mean Streets” about his coming 
of age in the 30s, 40s and 50s.221  Based on the FCC’s Golden Globe decision, PBS was 
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forced to edit out of the film words like “fuck” and “shit,” and some PBS affiliates 
requested words such as “piss”, “nigger” and “spic” be removed.222  Nebraska Public 
Television pulled the show completely from its line up.223
The recent activity by Congress and the Commission shows no signs of slowing anytime 
soon.  Unlike commissioner statements immediately after Pacifica, attempting to assure 
broadcasters that the Commission was still more interested in robust programming rather 
than the occasional expletive, members of the current Commission declare that it will use 
all ammunition in its armory and put to use any additional quivers in its arrows that 
Congress may give it to enforce the indecency statute.  The effect of such vigorous 
pursuit of so-called indecency ranges from PBS’ deletion of obscenities spoken by Iraqi 
soldiers in a Frontline program to an increasing lack of live programming in favor of 
tape-delayed broadcasts.224  The overall effect is that today, broadcasters are increasingly 
likely to adopt the philosophy of “when in doubt, leave it out.”225
Conclusion
The indecency doctrine began simply enough.  The Supreme Court’s Pacifica decision 
upheld the FCC’s finding of indecency for material that repeated certain expletives 108 
times during a 12-minute monologue.  What has grown out of that limited holding, 
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however, has become quite unwieldy.  From its original enforcement standard of 
sanctioning broadcasters for repetitive use of one of Carlin’s seven dirty words, to the 
expansion of regulation to double entendre and innuendo, to an indecency finding for the 
utterance of just one expletive in the midst of a live event, the FCC has moved well 
beyond Pacifica.  In doing so, it has taken upon itself the mantle of arbiter of what the 
average viewer finds patently offensive, inevitably substituting its own judgment of what 
is “shocking or vulgar” or whether the material “panders or titillates”.  The difficulty in 
allowing a governmental body to judge speech that is protected by the First Amendment 
is probably best illustrated by Justice Harlan’s admonition that “it is nevertheless often 
true that one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.”226
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